One important supply-side barrier to universal education is simply getting teachers to show up. We conducted an initial survey in rural Rajasthan, India, and found teachers to be absent 44% of the time. The researchers used a randomized controlled trial and a structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning. In treatment schools, teachers' attendance was monitored daily using cameras, and their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance. Teacher absenteeism in the treatment group fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group, and the children's test scores increased by 0.17 standard deviations. Researchers estimated a structural dynamic labor supply model and found that teachers responded strongly to financial incentives. 

Principal Investigators:
Rema Hanna
Esther Duflo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Stephen P. Ryan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

For this project EPoD partnered with J-PAL South Asia at IFMR to conduct the research. The team worked with the grassroots NGO Seva Mandir, located in Rajasthan state, as an in-country policy partner.

This research is supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.