@article{75,
  author = {Rohini Pande and Michael Greenstone and Esther Duflo and Nicholas Ryan},
  title = {What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-party Auditors},
  abstract = {We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator.},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {103},
  pages = {314-319},
}