PILOT STUDY: IMPROVING THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM TO INCREASE EMPLOYMENT

Abstract
Markets emerge and evolve, but they are also designed. Recently, economists and game theorists have started to focus on designing mechanisms for special applications such as university admissions. This approach has been called market design, economic engineering, or simply economic design. The proposed pilot study will draw upon a growing body of Nobel Prize-winning research to design a centralized matching algorithm to achieve incentive compatible, efficient and equitable placement of Saudi youth into colleges while also taking into account the unique challenges and requirements of the local context. In this initial phase, the primary goal will be to obtain a thorough understanding of the existing assignment system through interviews and surveys with officials. This information will then be used to study the equilibrium predictions of the existing decentralized matching system.

Expected Impact
Assess opportunities to increase efficiency and equity of the university admissions system in Saudi Arabia and improve employment prospects for young, skilled Saudis.

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PROGRAMS & POLICIES EXAMINED
- College Admissions

POLICY PARTNERS
- HRDF
- Ministry of Education